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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, consumers have increasingly relied
on electronic payment systems to make purchases in stores and
online.1 In these transactions, consumers allow merchants to trans-
mit their personal financial data among networks of banks and
third-party services to verify payment.2 Once approved, merchants
give consumers the good or service in exchange for electronic
payment.3 This chain of information and storage of large amounts
of personal data create an attractive target for hackers seeking to
steal financial data for fraudulent purposes. Rather than physically
stealing data from individual consumers one card at a time, hackers
can infiltrate vulnerable computer systems and download data
records containing the sensitive information of thousands of cus-
tomers.
Recent incidents affecting large merchants, such as Target,4
emphasize the growing occurrence and breadth of mass data breach-
es in the United States.5 Other entities with major data breaches
include T.J. Maxx/Marshalls,6 Heartland Payment Systems,7 Sony,8
1. See Catherine New, Cash Dying as Credit Card Payments Predicted to Grow in
Volume: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/07/credit-card-payments-growth_n_1575417.html [https://perma.cc/37H8-2GYK].
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See Data Breach FAQ, TARGET, https://corporate.target.com/about/shopping-
experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ#q5888 [https://perma.cc/G7LQ-VAQ4](last visited Feb.
21, 2016); Miles Parks, Target Offers $10 Million Settlement in Data Breach Lawsuit, NPR
(Mar. 31, 2015, 2:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/19/394039055/
target-offers-10-million-settlement-in-data-breach-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/RYT5-MF8L].
5. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005-Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach [https://perma.cc/GCW5-GZUF]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016). See generally N. ERIC WEISS & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. [CRS], R43496, THE TARGET AND OTHER FINANCIAL DATA BREACHES: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43496.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V87H-EHYS].
6. See Jaikumar Vijayan, One Year Later: Five Takeaways from the TJX Breach,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2538711/
cybercrime-hacking/one-year-later--five-takeaways-from-the-tjx-breach.html [https://perma.cc/
696P-KRHL].
7. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland Breach Expenses Pegged at $140MSo Far,
COMPUTERWORLD (May 10, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2518328/
cybercrime-hacking/heartland-breach-expenses-pegged-at--140m----so-far.html [https://perma.
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Home Depot,9 and Anthem.10 Although criminal actors seeking to
steal information perpetrated each of these attacks, the data
breaches also featured a lack of proper procedures and protections
on the part of the victimized company.11
Data breaches, particularly those affecting millions of people, im-
pose huge costs in the form of investigations, replacement cards,
fraudulent charges, damage to merchants reputations, and harm to
consumers privacy.12 Of course, some party or multiple parties
must assume financial responsibility for these damages. Currently,
the liability for breach rests with each harmed party, subject to
allocation by contract.13
In the small sample of data breaches noted above, hackers tar-
geted the weakest link along the chain of entities that protect
customer data merchants. Because the harm from data breaches
falls to each party not just the party that failed to implement
reasonable security standards merchants do not fully realize the
total costs of breach, and, therefore, merchants may underprotect
customer data.
This Note proposes that Congress pass legislation to hold busi-
ness entities liable for data breaches if they fail to exercise due care
in protecting personal information. From that initial distribution of
liability, parties could still freely contract with one another to
reallocate the risk, but the baseline liability would rest with the
party at fault for not adequately protecting against breach.
cc/8R7M-ZCD6].
8. See Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011, 8:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-sony-stolen
data-idUSTRE73P6WB20110427 [https://perma.cc/TV9C-4PHQ].
9. See John Kell, Home Depot Facing Dozens of Data Breach Lawsuits, FORTUNE (Nov.
25, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/25/home-depot-data-lawsuits/ [https://perma.
cc/NX73-FWLG].
10. See Michael Hiltzik, Anthem Is Warning Consumers About Its Huge Data Breach.
Heres a Translation., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hiltzik/la-fi-mh-anthem-is-warning-consumers-20150306-column.html#page=1 [https://perma.
cc/H83R-P7XV].
11. See, e.g., infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Indus-
try, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 206, 209 (2008) (arguing that private contracting produces more
efficient allocations of risk than government involvement).
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Part I of this Note introduces background on data breaches and
discusses the harms that the various parties suffer. Part II exam-
ines the current allocation of risk among parties by focusing on state
and federal laws, banks attempted litigation against merchants for
recovery of damages following data breach, and private agreements
between parties. Part III suggests policy goals and critical elements
necessary for any effective federal legislation seeking to set a uni-
versal standard for data security. This Part in particular contends
that the party responsible for failing to take adequate precautions
against data breach should initially bear the risk of loss. Part IV
applies the concepts of this Note to the Personal Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2014 (PDPSA) to assess whether the proposed
bill or a future bill of its kind meets the suggested policy goals
and includes the essential elements outlined in Part III. Lastly, Part
V anticipates overarching counterarguments that challenge the
effectiveness of a congressional approach.
I. DATA BREACHES AND HARM
Over 3 billion personal records have been exposed through data
breaches including 1.1 billion records in 2014 alone.14 These
statistics show that data theft will continue to threaten electronic-
ally stored personal information at unprecedented levels until the
industry implements stronger security protocols. Data breaches not
only affect the party from whom information is stolen, but also
many other companies and individuals that may share liability or
bear the cost of breach.15 Encouraging stronger security protocols,
therefore, benefits more than just the organization taking such
precautions.
14. RISK BASED SEC., INC., DATA BREACH QUICKVIEW: 2014 DATA BREACH TRENDS 1 (2015)
[hereinafter 2014 DATA BREACH TRENDS], https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/reports/2014-
YEDataBreachQuickView.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKV7-GKZJ]. By the third quarter of 2015,
over 350 million additional records have been exposed through data breaches. RISK BASED
SEC., INC., DATA BREACH QUICK VIEW: THIRD QUARTER 2015 DATA BREACH TRENDS 1 (2015)
[hereinafter THIRD QUARTER 2015 DATA BREACH TRENDS], https://www.riskbasedsecurity.
com/reports/2015-Q3DataBreachQuickView.pdf [https://perma.cc/65VR-NNYE].
15. See infra Part I.C.
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A. The Target Data Breach
Though data breaches can occur through a multitude of attack
schemes, this Note focuses on hacking, which accounted for 83.3
percent of records exposed in 2014.16 The data breach at Target
serves as a representative incident of hackers infiltrating a large
company that stored vast amounts of consumer data perhaps with-
out adequate protection.
The Target data breach, revealed in December 2013, ranked num-
ber eight on the list of all-time data breaches, with over 110 million
compromised records.17 Hackers obtained 40 million credit and
debit card account numbers ... [and]the names, addresses, phone
numbers, and email addresses of up to 70 million consumers.18 The
hackers first obtained credentials from a third-party vendor through
an email phishing scheme.19 With the credentials, the hackers ac-
cessed a portion of Targets system and remotely installed malware
on the point-of-sale registers.20 The malware copied payment infor-
mation directly from the register before it was encrypted, thereby
avoiding the need to decrypt the data.21
Critics suggest that a third-party vendor should never have pos-
sessed credentials capable of accessing the point-of-sale system
instead, the two electronic functions should have been partitioned
to prevent unauthorized access.22 Beyond the initial security flaws
that allowed access to the system, Target also did not immediately
respond to early warnings that personal data could be at risk.23
Instead, Target responded a month later, and only when contacted
by the Department of Justice about suspicious payment activity.24
16. 2014 DATA BREACH TRENDS, supra note 14, at 3. By the third quarter of 2015, hacking
accounted for 83.2 percent of the records exposed that year. THIRD QUARTER 2015 DATA
BREACH TRENDS, supra note 14, at 1.
17. 2014 DATA BREACH TRENDS, supra note 14, at 10.
18. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at i.
19. Id.; Brian Krebs, Target Hackers Broke in via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SEC., https://
krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/ [https://perma.cc/
QF6K-7NCW](last updated Feb. 14, 2014).
20. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at i; Krebs, supra note 19.
21. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 2.
22. See, e.g., Krebs, supra note 19.
23. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 2.
24. Id. at 3.
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B. The Payment Transaction Process
The Target example demonstrates one potential avenue by which
hackers can attack a merchants stored information. More impor-
tantly, the Target breach is emblematic of the inherent problems
with the current allocation of liability.
Because merchants necessarily share financial data with a
number of other entities to perform a transaction, a data breach can
occur at any of the various entities. In these instances, the fault
may not rest with a merchant, but perhaps with a financial institu-
tion or processing company, both of which could also be vulnerable
to electronic attacks. An explanation of the typical credit card trans-
action helps one to understand the multitude of companies that
must access and protect consumer information. It also highlights
the stakeholders that must ensure secure payment transactions in
order to avoid liability for wrongdoing.
The typical transaction begins at a retail location where the
consumer swipes their card using a point-of-sale system.25 A pay-
ment processing service communicates the data on the magnetic
strip of a consumers credit card from the merchant to the mer-
chants bank, known as the acquiring bank.26 The acquiring bank
then contacts the consumers bank, known as the issuing bank,
through a payment card company, such as Visa.27 The issuing bank
ensures that the consumers account can accept a charge.28 Once the
issuing bank accepts or denies the request, it sends a response back
to the acquiring bank through the payment card company.29
Through the payment processing company, the acquiring bank con-
veys the message to the retail location, where the transaction is
25. See id. at 8.
26. See id. at 7-8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08; Mark MacCarthy, Govern-
ment and Private Sector Roles in Providing Information Security in the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 8 I/S: J.L. & POLY FOR INFO. SOCY 242, 246-47 (2012).
27. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
28. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
29. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
982 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:975
approved or declined.30 If approved, the consumer walks away with
the merchandise, and the store receives a promise of payment from
the acquiring bank once the money is advanced by the issuing
bank.31 The consumer then repays the issuing bank after receiving
his or her monthly statement of charges.32
Not all transactions require a payment processing company to fa-
cilitate communication, but the basic structure above demonstrates
the complexity of a seemingly simple transaction. At any point
during the information exchange, one of the entities could suffer an
attack and allow a breach of consumer data; thus, consumer data
protections work only as well as the least secure link in the chain.
Just as this Note narrows its focus to attacks by hacking, it also will
consider only breaches that occur through the merchants access to
consumer information. The goal, then, would be to ensure that the
merchant has adequate incentives to avoid being a weak link.
C. Parties Harmed by Data Breaches
Data breaches impose costs on a number of parties that partici-
pate in the transaction process. For the purposes of this Note, the
consequences that merchants and issuing banks face are most im-
portant.33
30. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
31. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 211;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
32. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 8; Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 207-08;
MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 246-47.
33. Harm to consumers largely consists of inconvenience. Although stolen financial data
may lead to fraudulent charges made through the consumers account, Congress has limited
the maximum amount of fraudulent charges that an issuing bank can pass along to its con-
sumers to $50 for credit cards and $0 to $500 for debit cards, depending on when the consum-
er reports the fraud. 15 U.S.C. §§1643(a), 1693(g) (2012); WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at
11. In practice, almost all issuing banks offer fraud monitoring services, identity theft protec-
tion, and zero fraud liability as features of a consumers card. See John Kiernan, 2015 Fraud
Liability Study: Which Cards Protect You Best?, CARDHUB, http://www.cardhub.com/edu/
fraud-liability-study/ [https://perma.cc/8CEL-CDGV](last visited Feb. 21, 2016). Because of
these protections, consumers seldom pay for any fraudulent charges. Aside from the financial
liability, consumers have the inconvenience of reporting fraud, obtaining a new card, and per-
haps worrying about an increased likelihood of future fraud or identity theft. Id. Compared
with the financial effects passed along to issuing banks, these costs are nominal. See infra
Part I.C.2.
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1. Merchants
Merchants that suffer a data breach face more significant conse-
quences than their customers. Following a breach, merchants
typically hire cyber-security experts to evaluate the cause of the
breach and secure any vulnerabilities.34 Additionally, the merchant
must navigate public relations concerns, private penalties incurred
by contract, and potential regulatory violations for failing to meet
minimum security standards.35 Loss of consumer confidence could
also prove detrimental to the merchant in the short term.36 For
example, Target responded to consumer concerns regarding the
leaked information by offering a 10 percent discount in stores on
December 21 and 22, one week after the breach occurred.37 Issuing
banks may also impose chargebacks on fraudulent purchases, mean-
ing the merchants would not receive payment for merchandise that
they mistakenly allowed an individual to fraudulently purchase.38
In most cases, merchants will not be responsible for chargebacks if
the consumer presented a physical card to make the purchase.39 On
the other hand, online and over-the-phone payments are more dif-
ficult to verify and, therefore, banks place a greater burden on
merchants to accept such payments at their own risk.40
2. Issuing Banks
Issuing banks bear heavy expenses as a result of data breaches.
These institutions must identify and investigate fraudulent activity
34. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 5-6; ONLINE TR. ALL., 2015 DATA PROTECTION &
BREACH READINESS GUIDE 17-20 (2015), https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/resource/
documents/dpd_2015_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NB6-6XSY].
35. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 16-17; ONLINE TR. ALL., supra note 34, at 17-20.
36. See ONLINE TR. ALL., supra note 34, at 6.
37. Victor Luckerson, Target Gives Shoppers 10 Percent Off This Weekend, TIME (Dec. 20,
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/12/20/target-gives-shoppers-10-percent-off-this-weekend/
[https://perma.cc/58XB-EEK3].
38. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 9-10.
39. See Robert Berner & Adrienne Carter, The Truth About Credit-Card Fraud,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 20, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-06-20/the-truth-
about-credit-card-fraud [https://perma.cc/CVP3-G6P9]. See infra note 107 for a discussion on
the implementation of EMV card technology that shifted liability on October 1, 2015.
40. See Berner & Carter, supra note 39.
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to determine when the bank must issue new cards to consumers.41
Even though a merchants vulnerability may have caused the
breach, issuing banks usually serve as the first line of defense for
confused consumers who want to learn more about the security of
their information.42
In addition to the costs associated with identifying and processing
fraud, issuing banks also pay to issue new cards, which average
around $10 per card.43 Smaller banks spend a much higher amount
than larger banks when issuing new cards, so breaches create a dis-
proportionate effect on banks based on size.44 Banks also typically
suffer losses based on fraudulent charges surveyed banks estimat-
ed that the Target breach resulted in an average loss of $331 per af-
fected debit card and $530 per affected credit card.45 In general,
most banks, particularly smaller institutions with assets of less
than $1 billion, have received little to no reimbursement for these
breach-related expenses.46 Without an adequate means to recoup
41. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 18.
42. See BENCHMARKING & SURVEY RESEARCH, AM. BANKERS ASSN, TARGET BREACH
IMPACT SURVEY 13-14 (2014), http://www.aba.com/Tools/Function/Payments/Documents/
TargetBreachBankImpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6MH-4DQ5]. One bank employee provided
a narrative account of how the Target data breach impacted his institution:
Public news of the Target data breach broke at the same time Bank began re-
ceiving lists of potentially compromised cards from our processor. This news gen-
erated the largest consumer reaction I have experienced to any event in my 22
years at this Bank. Bank phones rang, literally, non-stop for the first few busi-
ness days following the public announcement. Handling and responding to these
calls consumed a majority of Bank resources during this time. Callers were
alarmed and very concerned about the safety of their accounts and personal in-
formation. Many consumers requested to have new debit cards issued to them
even if their card had not been identified as potentially compromised in the data
breach.
Id. at 14. In this case, the bank, rather than the merchant itself, bore the cost of responding
to the breach, thus expending significant resources. See id.
43. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 17; BENCHMARKING & SURVEY RESEARCH, supra
note 42, at 12 ([I]ncluded are costs for mailing, card stock, and additional staff resources,
etc.). 
44. BENCHMARKING & SURVEY RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 11 (comparing average re-
placement costs of $12.75 per credit card for banks holding less than $1 billion in assets with
average replacement costs of $2.99 per card for banks holding $50 billion or more in assets).
45. Id. at 10.
46. See id. at 17-21 (providing survey responses from small banks affected by the Target
breach).
2016] SHIFTING DATA BREACH LIABILITY 985
losses, issuing banks bear a huge burden of liability with little hope
of recovery from the merchants ultimately at fault.47
II. SHIFTING THE COST OF DATA BREACHES
Despite the national reach of many merchants and issuing banks,
the United States does not currently operate under a uniform stan-
dard for data security.48 Instead, litigants must look to the laws
within individual states to determine minimum data protection
standards, notification requirements, and burden-shifting mecha-
nisms to recover damages resulting from a data breach.49
A. Federal Data Security Standards
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has led the most successful
federal effort to regulate data security by bringing cases under the
theory that a failure to maintain reasonable security is an unfair
practice under the section 5 of the FTC Act.50 Specifically, in re-
sponse to the BJs Wholesale data breach, the FTC alleged that:
Respondents failure to employ reasonable and appropriate
security measures to protect personal information and files
caused or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that
is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or competi-
tion and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. This practice
was an unfair act or practice.51
The FTC has alleged inadequate data protection using data security
requirements that mirror the Data Security Standard (DSS) set by
the Payment Card Industry (PCI), a private organization designed
47. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 247.
48. Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in United States: Overview, PRAC. L., http://us.practical
law.com/6-502-0467 [https://perma.cc/3JY8-8MWM](last updated July 1, 2015).
49. See id.
50. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 251; see also John P. Hutchins & Renard C. Francois,
A New Frontier: Litigation over Data Breaches, 10 PRAC. LITIGATOR 47, 48-50 (2009).
51. Complaint at 3, In re BJs Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005) (No. C-4148),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/092305comp0423160.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NXM7-9F8D].
986 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:975
to set industry standards for credit card transactions.52 Importantly,
the FTCs reference to the PCI DSS supports the argument that the
PCI DSS represents a de facto legal duty in the payment industry.53
As such, companies may seek to comply with PCI DSS requirements
to avoid liability.54 The FTC model also illustrates that a federal
standard could simply reflect evolving industry norms, as developed
by a private organization.55
B. State Data Security Standards
State law factors into the equation much more heavily than feder-
al law. Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands have passed laws that require compa-
nies to notify parties affected by a data breach involving personally
sensitive information.56 These laws set a static condition that trig-
gers a duty: companies must notify customers about data breaches
involving personal financial information once the breach has oc-
curred.57 The statutes do not set or encourage industry standards to
actually prevent data breaches.58 Instead, these limits require
52. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 251; see also PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT
CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT
PROCEDURES (2015), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PY4L-QN9K][hereinafter PCI STANDARDS]. For a discussion of the PCI DSS,
see infra Part II.C.
53. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 251-52. See generally Hutchins & Francois, supra
note 50.
54. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 251-52.
55. See id.
56. Security Breach Notification Laws, NATL CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 11, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx[https://perma.cc/R9ZT-X5UY]. The NCSL makes clear that:
Security breach laws typically have provisions regarding who must comply with
the law (e.g., businesses, data/information brokers, government entities, etc.);
definitions of personal information (e.g., name combined with SSN, drivers
license or state ID, account numbers, etc.); what constitutes a breach (e.g., un-
authorized acquisition of data); requirements for notice (e.g., timing or method
of notice, who must be notified); and exemptions (e.g., for encrypted infor-
mation).
Id.; see also GINA STEVENS, CRS, R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 5-6
(2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42475.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB8Y-X46W](discussing
the different elements of security breach notification laws).
57. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287,
319 (2014).
58. See id. at 320-21.
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breached entities to share information about the data breach to
prevent unnecessary harm caused by delayed reporting.59
Some have criticized security breach notification statutes for
creating safe harbors that allow entities to avoid liability merely by
meeting certain requirements, such as encrypting data.60 One Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO) of a major healthcare company
commented on the effect of the security breach notification laws:
[N]otification laws ... have essentially reversed the whole direction
security was taking.... [S]ecurity investment is moved essentially to
crypto. Just encrypt as much as you can. Whatever it takes, just
encrypt it. If it moves, encrypt it. If it stays there, encrypt it.61
Encouraging companies to implement effective data security
protocols certainly meets policy objectives, but a problem arises if
companies allocate funding to comply with safe harbors rather than
actually implementing measures to make the system reasonably
secure. As the statute ages, a once useful data protocol will become
outdated and virtually useless.62
In addition to notification statutes, thirty-one states and Puerto
Rico have passed data disposal laws that require entities to de-
stroy, dispose, or otherwise make personal information unreadable
or undecipherable.63 These laws seek to prevent theft of private
financial information by limiting the information that entities store
on their servers.64
Massachusetts, which has enacted both notification and disposal
statutes,65 encourages businesses to follow the PCI DSS; for ex-
ample, consent judgments have required companies to maintain
PCI DSS compliance, or such compliance standards that may be
from time to time recognized by the payment card industry as
acceptable.66 Though not codified, this case law indicates that
59. Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50, at 49.
60. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 322.
61. Id. at 321.
62. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 253.




65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, §3 (West 2015); id. at ch. 93I, §2.
66. Final Judgment by Consent at 4, Commonwealth v. Briar Grp., LLC, Civ. No. 11-
1185B (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2011); see also MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 252 (discussing
Massachusettss efforts to incorporate the PCI DSS into its enforcement).
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Massachusetts supports enforcement of the PCI standards and
seeks to allow the Commonwealths standards to evolve with the
industry over time.67
Minnesota, the state where issuing banks brought suit against
Target,68 follows a different approach. Rather than follow the evolv-
ing PCI standard, the legislature incorporated specific elements of
the PCI DSS into its state law.69 This approach could present
problems as the industry standard changes and the statute remains
the same potentially creating a conflict between the industrys best
practices and outdated state law.70 If an entity suffers a data breach
while not complying with the statute, the law holds the entity liable
for consequential damages, including the harms suffered by issuing
banks.71 Although the enforcement of a mandated data security
standard and the availability of consequential damages currently
makes Minnesota one of the best defenders of data security, the
approach could have negative long-term effects if the state standard
becomes outdated.72
The inconsistent state and federal standards or lack thereof
make data breach litigation difficult to predict on a national scale.
In practice, the variety of standards creates a need for litigation,
which makes recovery difficult, if not impossible, for issuing
banks particularly for smaller institutions with limited resources
that may not be capable of challenging a larger merchant. Further-
more, state notification statutes demonstrate the potential dangers
of creating rigid exceptions to liability that cannot evolve over time.
C. Private Card Industry Data Security Standards
In 2006, American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB
International, MasterCard, and Visa, Inc. formed the Private Card
Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council (SSC) to promote
development, management, education, and awareness of the PCI
67. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 252.
68. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (D.
Minn. 2014).
69. MINN. STAT. §325E.64 (2014); see also MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 252 n.24.
70. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 252-53.
71. Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 221.
72. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 252-53.
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Security Standards.73 Member processing card companies require
users to agree to the Security Standards (PCI DSS) by contract in
order to issue cards (issuing banks) or accept payments (acquiring
banks and payment processing companies).74 In addition, these
agreements require acquiring banks to obtain a guarantee that
merchants working with the bank will comply with the PCI DSS as
well.75 Thus, the PCI Council effectively sets a minimum data
security standard for all stakeholders in the industry as a condition
on using the card service.76 The PCI DSS helps to distribute the risk
issuing banks hold by allocating liability to merchants, acquiring
banks, and payment processors based on non-compliance with the
required data security standards.77
The PCI DSS sets an industry standard by requiring twelve basic
protections for all users handling financial data. Users must:
1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect card-
holder data
2. [Refrain from using]vendor-supplied defaults for system
passwords and other security parameters
3. Protect stored cardholder data
4. Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public
networks
5. Protect all systems against malware and regularly update
anti-virus software or programs
6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
7. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know
8. Identify and authenticate access to system components
9. Restrict physical access to cardholder data
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and card-
holder data
11. Regularly test security systems and processes
73. About Us, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
organization_info/index.php [https://perma.cc/JZ7B-DP26](last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
74. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 249-50; PCI STANDARDS, supra note 52, at 12.
75. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 249.
76. See Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50, at 53 (A company processing, storing, or
transmitting payment card data must be PCI-DSS compliant or risk losing their ability to
process credit card payments and being audited and/or fined.).
77. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 248.
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12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all
personnel.78
Each of these requirements seeks to regulate the information that
entities maintain and implement procedures to protect that retained
information. The twelve practices outlined by the PCI also serve as
a model of industry best practices for other organizations, courts,
and legislatures.79
The PCI standards incentivize all parties to consider the potential
costs associated with data breaches.80 Depending on an individual
states contract law, however, parties can have difficulty applying
the agreed-upon standards consistently.81 Issuing banks, for exam-
ple, still have trouble recovering damages from merchants even
when all members have agreed to follow the same PCI data
standard.82
D. Litigation by Issuing Banks
Data breaches occur when hackers steal mass amounts of con-
sumer information from company servers, but most hackers never
face prosecution.83 Even if investigators could discover these
criminals and hold them liable, those criminals would not have the
financial resources to compensate the parties harmed by the breach.
In the absence of holding the criminal actor liable, litigants must
look to another party for compensation.
In cases in which a merchants inadequate security protocols
resulted in a data breach, consumers and issuing banks have at-
tempted to shift the damages they suffered back to the merchant
responsible for the breach.84 Pointing the finger at the merchant
78. PCI STANDARDS, supra note 52, at 5.
79. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 273 ([The] PCI [Security Standards Council] is
heavily involved in the development of information security standards.).
80. See id. at 254-55.
81. See infra Part II.D.
82. See infra Part II.D.
83. See Christina Parajon Skinner, An International Law Response to Economic Cyber
Espionage, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1180-81 (2014) (discussing the difficulty that the United
States and other countries have in prosecuting cyber-crimes).
84. See Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50, at 50-53 (summarizing recent examples of
private litigation against merchants for breaches of consumer data).
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may seem unfair because, after all, the merchant also fell victim to
the theft, but the merchant collected volumes of valuable informa-
tion in one location and then essentially left the vault open, the door
unlocked, or the key under the mat. Issuing banks especially smal-
ler institutions that struggle to bear the cost of data breaches have
attempted to recover damages from merchants following data
breaches.85 As in other consumer litigation, issuing banks have ar-
gued under negligence, breach of contract, and state law theories.86
1. Negligence
As plaintiffs, issuing banks may succeed in demonstrating dam-
ages, causation, and breach of a reasonable standard of care based
on the merchants noncompliance with contractual obligations to
third parties or with a statutory requirement. Banks have nonethe-
less struggled to show that merchants owed them a duty because
the issuing bank and merchant have no direct connection.87 To over-
come this challenge, issuing banks have tried to argue that a special
relationship between the parties creates a common law duty.88
Courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize a special relation-
ship that would create a common law duty.89
85. See, e.g., Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss at
1, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (D. Minn. Oct.
1, 2014) (No. 14-2522), ECF No. 204 (naming plaintiffs, including five financial institutions:
Umpqua Bank, Mutual Bank, Village Bank, CSE Federal Credit Union, and First Federal
Savings of Lorain).
86. Many consumers have attempted to raise class action claims against merchants for
failing to protect payment information. See generally 3 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW
§27.07, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2014). Consumers attempt to bring claims based on
the inconvenience of the breach or increased likelihood of future identify theft. See id. Courts
generally dismiss consumer claims because plaintiffs fail to establish any injury as a result
of the data breach because the issuing banks assume financial liability. See id. In some cases,
consumers establish constitutional standing but then fail to demonstrate injury as the
negligence claim requires. See id. The legal theories have included negligence, breach of an
implied contract, and statutory relief derived from various state laws. See id. This Note does
not, however, discuss the legal remedies available to consumers.
87. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 963 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Elavon, Inc. v. Ciseros Ristorante, Inc., No. 100500480,
2013 WL 8215464, at *4 (Utah Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2013).
88. See BancFirst v. Dixie Rests., Inc., No. CIV-11-174-L, 2012 WL 12879 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
4, 2012).
89. See id. at *4 ([Merchant]s responsibilities under the PCI Data Security Standards
reflect that these are general obligations that apply to all cardholders and banks, whether
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Even if plaintiffs survive the initial challenge of establishing the
prima facie case, merchants have successfully defended against
liability by asserting the economic loss doctrine.90 The doctrine var-
ies from state to state and therefore offers different protection
depending on jurisdiction.91
2. Breach of Contract
Under a breach of contract theory, issuing banks assert that a
contract between a merchant and the acquiring bank (or acquiring
issuing or acquirer. The obligations are not specific to [the plaintiff issuing bank]and do not
create a special responsibility by [the merchant] to [the issuing bank].); see also Defendants
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action
Complaint at 6-7, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304
(D. Minn. 2014) (No. 14-2522), ECF No. 183 (arguing that plaintiffs negligence claim should
be dismissed for failing to establish that a special relationship existed).
90. See, e.g., Cotton Patch Café, Inc. v. Micro Sys., Inc., No. MJG-09-3242, 2012 WL
5986773, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 2012).
91. See Banknorth, N.A. v. BJs Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (D. Me.
2005) (Not all states have adopted the economic loss rule, and those that have vary widely
in their understanding of the doctrines scope.); see also Lone Star Natl Bank, N.A. v.
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 2013) (examining how Texas and
New Jersey differ in their respective application of the economic loss doctrine). Applying New
Jersey law, the court in Lone Star National Bank, while adjudicating the Heartland Payment
Systems data breach, quoted the New Jersey Supreme Court on the purpose of the economic
loss doctrine:
Generally speaking, tort principles, such as negligence, are better suited for
resolving claims involving unanticipated physical injury, particularly those
arising out of an accident. Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally
more appropriate for determining claims for consequential damage that the
parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement.
Lone Star Natl Bank, 729 F.3d at 424 (quoting Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 489 A.2d 660, 671-72 (N.J. 1985)). The Fifth Circuit reversed the District Courts granting
of a motion to dismiss based on four findings. Id. at 426. First, the issuing banks constituted
an identifiable class. Id. Second, the claim would not impose limitless liability on the payment
processor (here, the payment processor suffered the data breach, not a merchant). Id. Third,
absent negligence there would be no other remedy for the issuing banks. Id. Fourth, it is not
clear whether the parties could have actually negotiated terms with one another because they
did not have a direct connection. Id.
The economic loss doctrine does not appear to be an issue in the Target litigation, applying
Minnesota law. See Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss
the Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 26-27, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2014) (No. 14-2522), ECF No. 204
(Minnesotas economic loss doctrine ... has been highly circumscribed by statute ... and has
no bearing on [the issuing banks] negligence claim (Target, tellingly, has not argued
otherwise).) (citation omitted).
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bank and payment/card processor) specified a minimum level of
data security and the merchant breached that contract by allowing
hackers to exploit a vulnerable system.92 Issuing banks must then
persuade the court to recognize the issuing bank as a third-party
beneficiary to the contract, thus allowing them to bring a breach of
contract claim.93
Applying Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit left open the possi-
bility of such an argument.94 The court concluded that in order to be
an intended beneficiary of the member agreement (between the
payment card company and the acquiring bank), the issuing bank
must prove that the payment card company intended to give the
issuing bank the benefit of the acquiring banks promise to ensure
that the merchant would comply with the provision of the member
agreement prohibiting merchants from retaining cardholder infor-
mation.95
The issuing banks various legal strategies demonstrate the prob-
lem created by the lack of uniform law outlining liability for data
breaches. Merchants operating throughout the country face varying
liability based on the states in which an issuing bank may find prop-
er jurisdiction and venue for a claim. For the banks, the patchwork
system means that the institution cannot always or even often
recover damages resulting from the merchants data breach.
Congress should correct these inconsistencies by implementing a
uniform allocation of liability between merchants and issuing
banks.
III. GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Creating a uniform security standard, rather than requiring an
interpretation of fifty separate state law practices, would help
companies that store consumer information better evaluate their
potential liability.96 Entities can then take concrete steps toward
92. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJs Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir.
2008).
93. See id. at 168, 172.
94. See id. at 173.
95. Id. at 172.
96. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 361.
994 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:975
compliance with one data security standard that, if followed, will
protect them from liability.
Congress should draft federal legislation designed to: (1) reduce
the occurrence of data breaches by allocating liability to the
breached party (merchants for this Note); (2) evolve with industry
standards to avoid outdated and ineffective requirements; and (3)
minimize consequential harm by requiring notification following a
data breach. In carrying out these three objectives, Congress would
protect consumers and issuing banks while encouraging better
merchant practices.
A. Prevention Through Allocation of Liability
Congress should incentivize merchants to take greater precau-
tions to protect sensitive data. Generally, risk can be best mitigated
by assigning liability to the party in the best position to avoid the
harm.97 In the case of data breaches, many different parties along
the chain of information could be responsible for a data breach.
Hackers may choose to target larger entities to obtain a large
amount of information at once or look for the party with the most
vulnerable system protocols. The current distribution of liability in
which consumers and issuing banks cannot recover damages from
merchants prevents merchants from fully realizing the harm
caused by inadequate standards.98
Instead, Congress should place liability with the breached party
(the merchant for the purposes of this Note) if that entity failed to
comply with the requisite data security standards. For companies
that fully comply with data security standards and yet still suffer a
breach because hackers will continue to engage in criminal activ-
ity the statute would not shift liability. Rather, each party would
be responsible for their own harms, as under the current system.
Although the FTCs current practice to extend the PCI DSS
through federal enforcement has proven successful, it stops short of
97. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-62 (1972) (explaining the cheapest cost avoider).
98. The same could be said of issuing banks or payment processors. Because each party
currently bears certain costs based on their role in the transaction, rather than their role in
the data breach, they do not have to account fully to one another. See MacCarthy, supra note
26, at 248.
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providing remedies to harmed parties such as issuing banks.99
Private contract has also failed to encourage adequate data security
or remedies for issuing banks.100 Therefore, many institutions
harmed by merchants failures to meet the minimum PCI security
standards must bear their own costs.101 A federal statute shifting
the burden to the breached party would expand the current FTC
enforcement regime to protect parties harmed by entities failures
to maintain proper data security protocols.
Merchants are in the best position to prevent attacks against
their own systems, so they should bear liability for those data
breaches that occur due to a lack of reasonable security. In order to
reduce vulnerability, merchants can implement stronger technology
systems, employ monitoring services, and maintain regular testing
on the system basically, merchants could fully embrace the PCI
DSS.102 Issuing banks, in contrast, can do very little to protect
information stored by the merchant. Thus, issuing banks should not
be held accountable for breaches resulting from poor data manage-
ment on the part of the merchant.103
Some argue that shifting additional liability to the merchants
would not achieve any beneficial results because the PCI already
pressures merchants to follow proper procedures in order to avoid
hefty fines.104 Therefore, the harm merchants currently suffer
following a data breach may already be enough to incentivize com-
pliance. For example, estimates indicate that Target may lose more
than $1 billion as a result of the breach, not to mention harm from
lost sales, damage to its reputation, and other costs merchants
bear.105 Nonetheless, data breaches continue to occur at an unprece-
dented rate, and holding the breached party responsible for
99. See id. at 251; see also Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50, at 49-50.
100. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 249-50 (doubting the effectiveness of a private
contract model, such as PCI DSS, to remedy the problem of data breaches fully on its own).
101. Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50, at 54.
102. See PCI STANDARDS, supra note 52, at 5, 13-14 (discussing best practices to comply
with PCI DSS requirements and the effect such compliance would have on payment system
vulnerability).
103. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 269. But see infra note 107.
104. See Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 216 (noting that PCI already allows processing
card companies to fine merchants for noncompliance. For example, Visa assesses penalties
up to $100,000 per incident and $500,000 per incident if the merchant was noncompliant).
105. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 6, 14-17, 19; see supra Part I.C.1.
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maintaining a vulnerable system may be the most efficient way to
combat the problem.
Another option would be to assign liability to the issuing banks
or maintain the current allocation, which also essentially has the
effect of placing liability on issuing banks.106 Financial institutions
may not be in the best position to prevent data breaches, but per-
haps they are in the best position to manage risk of liability. If the
transaction costs of issuing credit cards becomes too high, banks will
pass along these costs to their customers by raising rates and
charging additional fees to meet target margins. Banks could also
implement new card technology to make transactions safer or imple-
ment procedures to make transactions more difficult, either of which
could reduce the risk of fraud.107 Smaller banks would likely suffer
most from this approach, as they do under the current system,
because they have neither the same resources to mitigate fraud nor
the same elasticity to bear the brunt of liability in the face of mass
data breaches.108
106. Alternatively, Congress could allocate liability to consumers. Since consumers could
not afford to bear substantial losses resulting from fraud, they would be strongly incentivized
to conduct business only with trusted merchants and to protect the physical security of their
information. See Epstein & Brown, supra note 13, at 206. The majority of data breach crimes
occur, however, by hacking trusted merchants, suggesting that the average consumer could
do very little to protect themselves. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 268-69. Such a shift also
seems highly unlikely considering that consumer-friendly legislation has traditionally
protected consumers from potential harm. See supra note 33.
107. See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 10-12 (suggesting that issuing banks should im-
plement chip credit cards that would prevent a substantial amount of the fraud caused by
data breaches). Most credit card companies announced that liability for fraud would shift
to the entity not using EMV chips (whether the merchant or the bank) on October 1, 2015. See
e.g., Press Release, Visa, Visa Announces U.S. Participation in Global Point-of-Sale
Counterfeit Liability Shift (Aug. 9, 2011), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/bulletin-us-
participation-liability-shift-080911.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSU9-5YVR]; Cathy Medich, EMV
MigrationDriven by Payment Brand Milestones, EMV CONNECTION, http://www.emv-
connection.com/emv-migration-driven-by-payment-brand-milestones [https://perma.cc/2XPF-
P878](last visited Feb. 21, 2016). Despite the recent shift, many doubt whether merchants
and banks are ready for the change. See Samantha Masunaga, Some Small Businesses Still
Unsure About Credit Card Chip Technology, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.
latimes.com/business/la-fi-card-readers-20150728-story.html [https://perma.cc/3B4B-WV79].
This suggests that holding issuing banks liable for some share of the consequential
damages following a data breach acts as an incentive for the bank to minimize fraudulent
activity. Otherwise, the bank could allow continued charges at the expense of the merchant
responsible for the data breach.
108. See supra Part I.C.2.
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Merchants, therefore, are in the best position to avoid the harm
that all parties will suffer as a result of data breaches. Although
issuing banks may be capable of bearing the liability, such an
allocation would not help to alleviate the overall economic strain
posed by the underlying problem. By incentivizing merchants to
implement strong data security protocols, Congress will help to
reduce the overall incidence of data breaches and protect consumer
information.
B. Evolving Standards Based on the PCI DSS
Successful federal legislation depends on implementing a uniform
data security standard that can evolve over time based on industry
standards and changing technology. A dynamic standard will
require entities to constantly maintain adequate levels of data
protection rather than rely simply on compliance with a set, static
standard in order to avoid liability.109 Because the private sector has
already developed a widely used and accepted standard that
changes based on industry needs, Congress could rely on the PCI
DSS when creating federal requirements.110
Despite its high degree of predictability, codifying a particular set
of data security requirements would cause problems because the
codified standards could not adapt to changing industry stan-
dards.111 Similar to the Minnesota statute that codified the PCI
standard in part, this approach would become outdated over time
and, perhaps more importantly, create a conflict between federal
law and industry best practices.112 In the latter scenario, entities
could shield themselves from liability by complying with baseline
security protocols while still remaining vulnerable to hackers. As
previously noted, static provisions in a codified standard, such as
data encryption, could also create safe harbors that may prevent
companies from using their resources efficiently to prevent
109. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 268-69.
110. Id. at 274.
111. Id. at 253, 275.
112. Id. at 252-53.
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breach.113 Rather, companies will look to avoid liability without
developing new strategies.114
Instead, Congress should implement an evolving standard based
on the existing PCI DSS standard. Deference to the private sector
on forming a data security standard has many benefits. Congress
would not have to start from scratch in order to create a universal
standard, nor would it need to expend resources updating the pro-
mulgated standard over time.115 Private industry may also be in a
better position to determine the best practices for protecting
consumer information.116 Federal legislation supporting that stan-
dard could then ensure the safety of consumers information by
further encouraging compliance beyond PCI sanctions established
by private contracts.117
The FTC has challenged entities that suffered data breaches by
alleging that a failure to maintain reasonable security is an unfair
practice under the section 5 of the FTC Act.118 The FTC has thus
already taken a step in the direction of validating the PCI DSS as
a national standard defining reasonable precautions that an entity
should employ to protect consumer data and avoid potential lia-
bility. Congressional support of the same standard would produce
predictable effects and support a familiar regime that can evolve
over time in response to best practices in the industry.
C. Notification
Requiring notification following the exposure of personal financial
information should not raise controversy. Because most states
113. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 321.
114. See id. at 321-23.
115. See MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 271 & n.65, 274.
116. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 293. Such deference to outside standards would not be
unprecedented, as Congress referenced outside agencies to consult on evolving standards for
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 262(a),
264(d), 110 Stat. 1936, 2021, 2034 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§204, 508(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1391, 1442-43
(1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.), to ensure that experts, who are in
the best position to understand the changing nature of data in the industry, can influence the
security standard. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 313-15.
117. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 293.
118. MacCarthy, supra note 26, at 251. See generally Hutchins & Francois, supra note 50,
at 48-50.
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already enforce some type of notice requirement to lessen the effect
of data breach harm, a federal standard would serve to unify expec-
tations without changing the underlying policy already in place.119
State laws typically structure notification requirements by:
(1) delineating who must comply with the law;
(2) defining the terms personal information and breach of
security;
(3) establishing the elements of harm that must occur, if any, for
notice to be triggered;
(4) adopting requirements for notice;
(5) creating exemptions and safe harbors;
(6) clarifying preemption and relationshipsto other federal laws;
and
(7) creating penalties, enforcement authorities, and remedies.120
Congress must first determine whether the requirement will
apply to all entities or create exceptions for smaller businesses,
nonprofits, or government entities. The provision should provide as
few exceptions as possible to meet the purpose of preventing further
harm resulting from a data breach. Even if smaller entities do not
have the same resources as larger organizations in order to prevent
breaches from occurring in the first place, small entities can still
notify customers of a breach.
Congress would then need to define the type of information that,
if exposed, would trigger notification duties. Describing such in-
formation as personally identifiable information, states have pro-
tected an individuals first name or initial and last name combined
with S[ocial]S[ecurity]N[umber]; drivers license or state ID number;
account number, credit or debit card number, combined with any
required information that allows access to account or any other
financial information.121 Similarly, a federal standard should seek
to protect any information not obtainable through public records
that would connect an individuals identity to a sensitive piece of
information, such as a Social Security Number or financial account
data. This meets the overall goal of notifying customers when
119. See supra Part II.B.
120. STEVENS, supra note 56, at 5.
121. Id. at 6.
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hackers have exposed potentially threatening information, thus
allowing the individual and other affected entities to respond and
minimize further loss.
Congress should exercise caution with regard to safe harbors.
Locking in certain protocols that limit liability could encourage
entities to maintain static data security policies designed to avoid
liability rather than protect data.122 The stagnating effect of data
encryption safe harbors on data security innovation demonstrates
the potential difficulties of creating exceptions based on compliance
with concrete standards.123 Instead, Congress should tie its notifica-
tion requirement to general compliance with a federal data standard
outlined in the statute. That standard could then account for chang-
ing technology and prevent complacent procedures.124
Lastly, providing an effective remedy will allow enforcement of
the notification provision. Though separate penalties may apply for
noncompliance with the overall data security standard, specific
notification damages will serve the goal of lessening the harm of
data breaches once they occur. Some state statutes include private
rights of action to recover damages caused by a failure to report in
a timely manner, whereas other states simply provide statutory
damages based on the number of violations and the time delay be-
fore proper reporting and notification.125 A federal provision should
implement statutory damages per violation in order to prevent mass
litigation over difficult-to-measure consequential damages. In many
cases, statutory damages could exceed actual damages and would
thus serve to encourage compliance while still benefitting harmed
individuals who may struggle to demonstrate the injury necessary
to secure compensation.126
122. See supra Part III.B.
123. See Thaw, supra note 57, at 321-22, 362-65.
124. See supra Part III.B.
125. See, e.g., CAL.CIV.CODE §§1798.29, 1798.82 (West 2014), amended by 2015 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 522 (West); S.C. CODE ANN. §§1-11-490, 39-1-90 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-186.6
(2015); see also STEVENS, supra note 56, at 7.
126. See supra Part II.D.
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IV. EVALUATING THE PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT
OF 2014
The proposed Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014
(PDPSA) provides an example of the type of legislation that Con-
gress could enact in response to the increased number of mass data
breaches.127 The Senate has taken no substantial action on the bill
since Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the bill in January 2014.128
Similarly, the House of Representatives has not made progress on
the companion bill that Representative Carol Shea-Porter intro-
duced in February 2014.129
Despite the apparent failure of the bill to gain any traction in
Congress, the PDPSA nonetheless offers a starting point for concep-
tualizing how the legislature could accomplish the recommended
goals set forth in Part III: to (1) reduce the occurrence of data
breaches by shifting liability to the breached party, (2) provide an
evolving standard of reasonable data protection, and (3) minimize
consequential harm by establishing uniform notification require-
ments.130 Although the PDPSA would make progress on each goal,
it neither advocates a wholesale reallocation of liability to the
breached party nor provides a clear standard for data protection.
A. Purpose and Scope
In its congressional findings, the Senate acknowledged that
hackers have increasingly targeted large databases of consumer
information and that such breaches pose a serious threat to the
Nations economic stability.131 To address the threat, the PDPSA
127. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong.
128. All Bill Information (Except Text) for S.1897 - Personal Data Privacy and Security Act
of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1897/all-info
[https://perma.cc/DBQ9-LAF4](last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
129. All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.3990 - Personal Data Privacy and Security
Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3990/all-
info [https://perma.cc/V6AG-JP5D](last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
130. See supra Part III.
131. S. 1897 §2(2). President Obama expressed a similar concern, issuing an Executive
Order in February 2013 designed to improve cybersecurity. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013) (The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to
grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges we must confront.);
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suggests that business entities should adopt reasonable procedures
to ensure the security, privacy, and confidentiality of ... personally
identifiable information.132 The recommendation comports with this
Notes assertion that merchants should be held liable for harm
resulting from data breaches, and that the burden should not rest
primarily with issuing banks.
The PDPSA applies to [a] business entity engaging in interstate
commerce that involves collecting, accessing, transmitting, using,
storing, or disposing of sensitive personally identifiable information
in electronic or digital form on 10,000 or more United States
persons.133 Limiting the applicability to businesses that maintain
the data of a significant number of consumers prevents small busi-
nesses from falling under the burden of extensive data protection
requirements. Yet, many small businesses still may fall within the
PDPSA given the common exchange of personal information.
The extensive types of protected data reveal more about the scope
of the PDPSA than the quantity threshold. Under the PDPSAs
definition, sensitive personally identifiable information includes
any of the following combinations of information: (1) first initial,
last name, phone number, and date of birth; (2) drivers license
number; or (3) financial account number.134 The same information
could be located on a Facebook account, displayed while making an
alcohol purchase, or disclosed by using a check or credit card. The
real threat is not the information itself, but the accumulation of
thousands of records in one location. The wide scope of protected
data follows similar definitions used by states in their notification
statutes, showing a widespread recognition that even basic informa-
tion should receive protection.135
see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secy, Executive
Order Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/ H8DG-XB52].
132. S. 1897 §2(4).
133. Id. §201(b).
134. Id. §3(11).
135. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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B. Prevention Through Allocation of Liability
The PDPSA addresses the first goal to encourage private enti-
ties to employ stronger preventative measures and avoid future data
breaches by (1) imposing civil penalties for failure to meet a level
of reasonable data protection and (2) allowing equitable relief to
enjoin private entities from operating in violation of data security
standards.136 The PDPSA would not force a wholesale reallocation
of liability from issuing banks to merchants; instead, the enforce-
ment measures seek to reduce the overall occurrence of breaches by
incentivizing businesses to take greater precautions and avoid
statutory liability.137
The PDPSA empowers the FTC to enforce the proposed data pro-
tection requirements.138 Granting clear authority to the FTC makes
sense given the FTCs current efforts to enforce data security under
section 5 of the FTC Act.139 The PDPSA would expand the FTCs
authority and provide a more solid ground to impose sanctions on
entities that fail to meet a reasonable standard of protection.
1. Civil Penalties
Either the FTC or a state enforcement agency may seek civil
penalties of up to $1 million if a business fails to follow data protec-
tion requirements.140 The enforcement scheme initially assesses up
to $5000 per violation per day that the violation continues.141
Typically, the total sum resulting from one act or omission would
not exceed $500,000.142 If the court determines that the act or
omission constituted willful or intentional conduct, the court could
136. See S. 1897 §§102, 203.
137. See id.
138. Id. §203(b). Apart from the FTC, state enforcement agencies may also bring a claim
against business entities in district court if violations under the statute harm residents of the
state. Id. §203(c). The State could seek civil penalties or equitable relief to enforce compli-
ance. Id.
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. S. 1897 §203(a)-(c)(2).
141. Id. §203(a)(1), (c)(1)(C).
142. Id.
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impose additional penalties of $5000 per willful or intentional
violation per day, also capped at $500,000.143
When measured against the substantial harm caused by data
breaches and the potential liability shared between merchants and
banks, the civil penalties outlined in the PDPSA offer virtually no
additional incentive to implement a data security program. In the
Target data breach alone, Target spent $61 million in one quarter
and faced over eighty lawsuits.144 Experts estimated that the breach
will result in $1.4 billion to $2.2 billion in fraudulent charges made
using stolen financial information.145 Target could also face fines
between $400 million and $1.1 billion from the PCI Council.146 Given
that the potential harm caused by violating the data protection
requirements could range in the billions, civil penalties capped at $1
million (and even then only for willful or intentional acts or omis-
sions) hardly seem adequate to influence behavior.
The liability assignment would be more powerful if the penalty or
damages applied to each individual record that the entity failed to
protect, rather than the overall violation. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), for example, imposes statutory damages between $100
and $1000 for each instance.147 Under that model, the liability that
the party failing to protect consumer information incurred would
vary based on the number of people harmed, not just the number of
security violations.148
If Congress calculated liability based on the number of data re-
cords involved, then it would have to determine a reasonable dollar
limit per record. At the FCRA maximum of $1000 per person, a
merchant, such as Target, would be liable for $110 billion based on
the 110 million records exposed clearly an excessive amount. Since
the customers themselves face minimal actual damages, a reason-
able figure should derive from the harm the breach causes the
issuing banks, who bear the brunt of the damages.149 Though the
143. Id. §203(a)(2)-(3), (c)(2).
144. TARGET CORP., FORM 10-K, ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGEACT16-17 (2014),http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/27419/00000
2741914000014/tgt-20140201x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/U9CY-A88R].
145. WEISS & MILLER, supra note 5, at 6.
146. Id.
147. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 §616, 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(1)(A) (2012).
148. Id.
149. See supra Part I.C.2.
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actual costs incurred as a result of data breach vary among banks,
a figure of $10 per consumer would cover most, if not all, consequen-
tial harm.150 Under a cap of $10 per violated customer, Target would
be liable for up to $1.1 billion due to its data breach. Of course, a
court could decide to award any fraction of the maximum figure.
Assessing damages based on the number of violated customers and
the costs associated with the breach would force merchants to in-
ternalize the costs associated with data breaches and take adequate
precautions to avoid liability.
Congress would also need to decide to whom payments would be
disbursed. Civil penalties do not compensate parties that suffer
damages as a result of the breach; they pose an incentive only to
maintain proper data security. The minimal deterrent effect of civil
penalties would mean little to banks faced with actual breach-rela-
ted damages. Instead of treating the $1.1 billion liability ($10 per
record) as a civil penalty, Congress should allow courts to disburse
awards, not to exceed the cap, to parties harmed by the breach. One
district court would consolidate all claims against the breached
party, assess damages, and accordingly award the litigants dam-
ages. In the event that the actual damages fall short of the cap, the
remainder could be collected as a penalty if the judge decided to do
so.
The recommended amendment to the civil penalties provision
would force businesses to consider the full cost of a potential breach
and provide an opportunity to compensate injured parties for the
breached partys failure to take reasonable precautions. Of course,
some data breaches will occur even with data security protocols, and
in those situations the breached party would not be liable under the
statute if it exercised due care.
Neither the PDPSA nor the recommended damages scheme would
affect the ability of private parties to further allocate liability by
contract. Legislation would simply set the logical baseline that a
party who fails to exercise due care should be liable for the harm
that ensues.
150. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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2. Equitable Relief
In addition to the civil penalties discussed above, the PDPSA also
permits courts to enjoin a business from allowing a violation to
continue.151 The courts equitable power reduces the concern that a
business may intentionally fall below the industry standard because
it deems noncompliance more economically efficient.
A business would be unlikely to face an injunction until there has
already been a breach of security, as the FTC will not be in a posi-
tion to investigate compliance for every entity. So, while an
injunction may prevent further harm, it would not serve as a strong
incentive to avoid violations up front. Given the reactionary nature
of the injunctive relief, this provision does little to incentivize robust
data security precautions. Nonetheless, it would provide a safety net
to prevent companies from continuous, willful violation of the
statute.
C. Evolving Standards Based on the PCI DSS
An important part of prevention depends on setting an appropri-
ate standard that can evolve over time with industry standards and
with changes in technology. For the purposes of the federal statute,
Congress must decide who should set the standard and what that
standard should entail.
1. Who Sets the Standard?
The PDPSA involves several parties in the development of a data
protection standard. Rather than creating a definite standard itself,
the PDPSA seeks to ensure standards for developing and imple-
menting administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to
protect the security of sensitive personally identifiable informa-
tion.152 Businesses must maintain protection equal to industry
standards or standards widely accepted as an effective industry
practice.153 The PDPSA empowers the FTC to determine the
151. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. §203(a)(4).
152. Id. §201(a) (emphasis added).
153. Id. §201(d).
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appropriate industry standard on a case-by-case basis, depending on
the type of information involved and the characteristics of the
business.154
In reality, this probably means that the PCI DSS would set the
bar for reasonableness in the credit card payment industry for two
reasons. First, since credit card companies and payment processors
already use and require compliance with the PCI DSS, the protocols
set by the PCI are, in fact, the industry standard.155 The PDPSA
would require businesses that have not contracted with a PCI
member to still comply with that standard because it represents
custom in the industry. Second, the FTC currently looks to the PCI
DSS for a reasonable standard of data security when investigating
its claims of unfair practices under section 5 of the FTC Act.156
There is no apparent reason why the FTC would abandon its under-
standing of the industry norm in favor of a new standard.
Despite the FTCs role as the interpreter of the reasonable
industry standard and the PCI DSSs likely guidance in defining the
standard, the PDPSA provides a large degree of flexibility that
allows each entity to implement a viable and effective plan. In fact,
under the bill, the lack of a specific practice or technology cannot
alone result in noncompliance. Enforcers first must consider the
entitys data plan as a whole.157 This allows private entities to
develop cost-effective programs best suited to protecting their
information. Specifically, it prevents the creation of a static safe
harbor that marks illusory compliance rather than encourages
actual security. The next Section discusses the boundaries set by the
statute within which each company can develop its own data privacy
and security program.
2. Statutory Requirements
The PDPSA requires each qualifying entity to implement a com-
prehensive personal data privacy and security program.158 Programs
include administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that vary
154. Id.
155. See supra Part II.C.
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. S. 1897 §201(d).
158. Id. §202(a).
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depending on the size of the business and the type of information
stored.159 In order to allow this variance, the PDPSA provides broad
guidelines on developing a comprehensive plan, but does not require
any specific measure.160
First, the program must be designed with the following goals: to
(1) ensure the security of personal information, (2) protect against
anticipated vulnerabilities, and (3) protect against unauthorized
access to ... information.161 If accomplished, meeting these goals
would reduce data breaches significantly. Of course, some breaches
would come from unanticipated vulnerabilities and, despite ade-
quate measures, the program may not always operate effectively.
Second, the program must include a risk assessment in which the
business shall: (1) identify reasonably foreseeable internal and
external vulnerabilities; (2) assess the likelihood of and potential
damage from unauthorized access; (3) assess the sufficiency of its
policies, technologies and safeguards in place to control and
minimize risks from unauthorized access; and (4) assess the
vulnerability of sensitive personally identifiable information during
destruction and disposal of such information.162 This phase of the
plan requires businesses to gather the information necessary to
protect their data. Rather than create a uniform set of procedures,
the PDPSA guides companies though a self-diagnosis to determine
where data protection measures will effectively reduce the potential
risk of harm to individuals who trusted their data to the company.163
Identifying internal and external vulnerabilities shows potential
points of entry where the business needs to place protective barriers
to keep hackers and unauthorized users away from sensitive
information. Calculating the likelihood and potential damage from
unauthorized access helps entities allocate resources efficiently by
placing the most extensive security in areas where the risk of harm
poses the greatest threat. Assessing the sufficiency of current
policies and technologies recognizes the gap between present data
protections and the desired security identified above. Lastly, asses-
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reminds entities to protect sensitive data even when it no longer
serves an internal purpose.
Third, the company must institute reasonable measures to
manage and control the risk. In this stage, the business must take
precautions appropriate for the size of the entity, the sensitivity of
its data, and the nature of its activity.164 These security measures
must: (1) control access to systems and facilities containing sensitive
information; (2) detect and record information about actual and
attempted unauthorized access to sensitive material; (3) protect
sensitive data by using encryption or access controls common in the
industry; (4) ensure proper destruction of sensitive information; (5)
trace credentials of users who have gained access to information;
and (6) prevent third parties from accessing information without
first passing a company review.165 Additionally, the plan should
limit the amount of personally sensitive data retained.166
The elements of the comprehensive personal data privacy and
security program leave significant discretion to individual entities.
Each of the requirements above ensures that the entity asks the
proper questions when developing a plan to protect sensitive infor-
mation. More importantly, the PDPSA does not limit the applicabil-
ity of the standard to one place and time.167 Instead, the guidelines
set forth can evolve over time, and programs can change with new
technology, as they must. These risk control factors find a proper
balance between a clear statutory framework and a flexible stan-
dard that can evolve over time.
D. Notification
The PDPSA requires that entities provide customers with notice
regarding data breaches within a reasonable period of time.168 The
PDPSA would allow an entity to delay notice only for the time
necessary to determine the scope of the security breach, assess the




167. See id. §201(d)(1).
168. Id. §211(a)-(c).
1010 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:975
system.169 This investigation, conducted prior to notification,
generally would not exceed sixty days, but the breached party could
obtain an extension from the FTC if necessary.170
The initial sixty-day limit strikes a balance between the entitys
need to evaluate the extent of the breach and the customers desire
to avoid future harm. By limiting the time frame, the PDPSA en-
sures that businesses will not intentionally drag their feet following
a breach to avoid disclosure. Without an investigatory period, the
breached party would not actually be able to provide much useful
information to its customers because it would not yet know the
extent of the breach or the risk posed. The delay also allows enough
time to strengthen security protocols, rather than inviting more at-
tacks while still vulnerable.
There are two significant exceptions to the notification require-
ment. First, the Secret Service or the FBI may decide to restrict
notification in the interests of national security.171 The second, and
more relevant to this Note, releases businesses from notification
responsibilities if there is no significant risk that a security breach
has resulted in, or will result in, identity theft, economic loss or
harm, or physical harm to the individuals whose sensitive person-
ally identifiable information was subject to the security breach.172
The business makes this determination after performing a required
risk assessment and must provide notice to the FTC of its intent to
invoke the exception within forty-five days.173 The FTC then has ten
days to respond with a contrary determination that the business
must provide notification.174 If no substantial risk of harm exists,
then the company does not have to expend extensive resources
providing notice, answering consumer concerns, and repairing its
damaged brand.175
Whether the breach poses a risk of substantial injury depends on
the type of data stolen and the condition in which the hacker ob-
tained the information. The PDPSA follows state law models that
169. Id. §211(c).
170. Id.




175. See supra Part I.C.
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create an exemption by establishing a limited safe harbor for
businesses using encrypted data.176 Rather than creating a blanket
safe harbor, the PDPSA establishes only a rebuttable presumption
that the encryption of personally identifiable information presents
no significant risk.177 Similarly, any method of making the informa-
tion unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through data security
technology would also create a rebuttable presumption that the
breach does not pose a significant risk.178
The rebuttable presumption avoids the dangerous incentive of a
safe harbor that encourages compliance with just one aspect of a
data protection plan. At the same time, the presumption rewards
entities for taking measures to protect stored data. Generally, the
presumption should prove true and notice would not be required,
but the FTC oversight protects consumers if, in a particular breach,
encryption alone does not mitigate the threat of further harm.
The notification provisions set forth by the PDPSA do not create
any surprising requirements. Rather, the regulations mirror the
most common state law statutes.179 The importance of a federal
notification provision rests in the uniform standard established
nationwide. Instead of interpreting many different state laws, busi-
nesses would have only to follow one notification scheme, making
notification easier and clearer for businesses.
As previously noted, the state notification statutes do not prevent
data breaches from occurring, nor do they shift any liability from
the issuing banks to the merchant.180 Notification simply requires
businesses to disclose information regarding the breach and to alert
customers to potential harm following the release of personal
information.181 Nonetheless, the reduction in consequential damages
certainly makes the notification requirement valuable, particularly
in conjunction with a uniform standard.
176. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
177. See S. 1897 §212(b)(2).
178. Id.
179. See id. §211; see also supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. See supra Part II.B.
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E. Overall Assessment
The PDPSA takes a significant step toward protecting consumers
from data breaches. Merchants, such as Target, would have to cre-
ate a comprehensive data security program to prevent data breaches
from occurring, pay fines for failure to prevent breaches through
reasonable precautions, and notify customers when they face a risk
of harm from the breach.182
The data standard itself meets the suggestion for a data security
standard based on the PCI DSS. Although the PDPSA does not
explicitly identify the PCI, it calls for an industry standard inter-
preted by the FTC.183 Importantly, the PDPSA does not simply
adopt the PCI standard, but enables its use by establishing a broad
framework of considerations under which companies must create
their own data programs. Entities would be well-advised to base
their programs on recommendations made by the PCI, but the
statute would allow that standard to change over time in response
to new technology and new threats.
The civil penalties imposed by the PDPSA would have little effect.
The potential penalties pale in comparison to the substantial losses
that the parties would collectively suffer.184 Given the costs paid by
merchants alone, the penalties do not create much of an incentive
to comply. Further, the penalties do not seek to compensate those
harmed the most issuing banks and do not attempt to reallocate
the liability caused by a breach. The PDPSAs failure to meet this
goal probably derives from its focus on protecting consumers rather
than issuing banks. Nonetheless, ignoring this problem prevents
merchants from fully internalizing the cost of noncompliance with
security standards.
Lastly, the PDPSA notification requirement addresses the prob-
lem of inconsistent state statutes. The consumer notice obligation
offers reasonable time frames and exemptions to protect businesses
from unnecessary costs following a breach with a low risk of harm.
182. In the Target example, a properly executed program would have prevented the third-
party vendor from having access to the sensitive information that hackers eventually stole.
See supra Part I.A.
183. S. 1897 §202(a).
184. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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At the same time, it reduces consequential damages by enforcing
notice when the breach poses a substantial risk to consumers.
On the whole, the PDPSA would improve the current state of data
protection. However, the failure to address the imbalance between
merchants and issuing banks leaves the door open for future data
breaches based on inadequate incentives to provide stronger data
security protections.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Creating and enforcing a federal standard will no doubt face
much criticism. The following counterarguments raise and refute
theoretical concerns in opposition to a congressional approach.
A. Private Entities Should Be Able to Allocate Risk by Contract
One theoretical argument in opposition is that private entities are
in the best position to understand the risk associated with their
private business transactions. Since the parties themselves can
allocate risk by contract, Congress does not need to pass any legis-
lation that would frustrate the market.
This argument fails to recognize that the problems with the
current system stem from the lack of uniform guidelines. The vol-
ume and scope of data breaches themselves show that private
entities in the market cannot successfully protect user data. When
a breach occurs, the effects ripple throughout the payment card
industry, from the customer to the merchant and the issuing bank,
among others.185 Suggesting that each of these parties should enter
into contractual agreements with one another stretches the realm
of possibility. The transaction costs necessary to effectuate the
volume of agreements sufficient to cover the entire industry would
be cost-prohibitive.186
Although two parties such as the merchant and the customer,
the issuing bank and the payment processing company, or the
merchant and the acquiring bank may be able to negotiate an
acceptable agreement, some entities that bear risk cannot enter into
185. See supra Part I.C.
186. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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contractual relationships with those that control that risk.187 At
best, these companies can argue that they constitute third-party
beneficiaries of existing contracts. However, courts have been
reluctant to accept that argument to find liability.188
The creation of a congressional structure that allocates risk to the
merchant when the merchant fails to meet a reasonable standard of
care would not prevent parties from continuing to contract around
liability. Merchants could still pass on their liability by contract to
banks or insurance providers, but they would simply have to pay to
pass on the risk (that the merchant can control) to a third party.
B. Congress Does Not Need to Implement Protection for
Sophisticated Parties
In an argument similar to the one outlined above, opponents
could argue that sophisticated parties do not need congressional
assistance to allocate risk or set data security standards. This asser-
tion ignores the varying size of entities harmed by data breaches
and attacked by hackers. In fact, smaller banks suffer at a much
higher rate than larger banks in the wake of data security breach-
es.189 While large banks may be capable of negotiating contracts to
shift liability, the small banks would likely struggle to do so.
A variation of the same issue arises among parties that store
sensitive personal information. Large entities may be more capable
of implementing data security precautions, whereas small compa-
nies may not have the same resources to spend on protection. The
congressional approach would shift liability to protect less powerful
banks and enforce standards tailored to the size of entities storing
information.190
A set of uniform requirements protects all parties involved in
payment transactions. Sophisticated parties have failed to allocate
liability sufficient to reduce the occurrence of data breaches and to
protect customers and issuing banks that do not have contractual
187. For example, the issuing banks cannot enter directly into agreements with every
merchant, so they cannot privately agree on how they will share the risk of liability in the
event of a data breach.
188. See supra Part II.D.2.
189. See supra Part I.C.2.
190. See supra Part IV.C.2.
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relationships with merchants. The congressional approach instead
provides all parties with a plan designed to protect against breach
and allocate the risk accordingly, regardless of sophistication.
C. Reliance on the PCI DSS and Industry Standard Negates a
Congressional Approach
If Congress implemented a uniform set of data security rules
based on the PCI DSS, critics could argue that reliance on the PCI
DSS or an industry standard means that Congress has essentially
delegated its responsibilities back to private parties.
Under the PDPSA, there probably would not be a significant
change in the requirements for data security.191 The strength of the
congressional approach is not that Congress will implement a
revolutionary new standard, but that Congress will enforce the
standard set by the industry and hold liable those responsible for a
breach if they fail to take reasonable preventative measures.
However, Congress would not blindly enforce a private standard.
The PDPSA proposes that the FTC designate the standards by
which it will evaluate the appropriateness of data security proto-
cols.192 At the moment, this would likely mean enforcement of the
PCI DSS, but the FTC could add additional requirements or rely on
a new standard as the industry changes.193 The congressional
approach looks to private industry to determine reasonableness, but
ultimately the FTC and the federal courts would enforce compliance.
191. See supra Part IV.C.
192. See supra Part IV.C.
193. If Congress became concerned that the PCI standard presented a biased standard
designed to shift undue liability to merchants by setting a high bar for security, then the FTC
could create a committee for evaluating the industry and setting a standard. The committee
could include a variety of interested parties, such as issuing banks, acquiring banks, card
processing companies, and merchants. The variety of backgrounds and diversity of opinions
would help create a reasonable data standard that fairly allocates risk among the parties.
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CONCLUSION
The prevalence of electronic payment transactions, the wide-
spread transmission of information, and the common storage of per-
sonal data have created an attractive target for hackers seeking to
steal financial data for fraudulent purposes. Recent data breaches
at large retailers demonstrate the significance of data privacy and
security.
Despite this importance, private entities have failed to create
adequate incentives to prevent data breaches. Merchants, a group
that has suffered from many of the most recent high-profile attacks,
bear a disproportionately low amount of the liability given their
unique position to prevent data breaches from occurring. These data
breaches incur huge costs totaling in the billions of dollars. Under
the current system, the risk of liability generally rests with each
harmed party, and not necessarily the merchant whose failed
security measures allowed the breach.
This Note argues that Congress should pass legislation to hold
companies liable for data breaches if they fail to exercise due care in
protecting the information. To date, harmed parties, particularly
issuing banks, have been unsuccessful at recovering damages from
the breached party through existing legal standards.194 Successful
legislation should aim to: (1) encourage the prevention of data
breaches by allocating liability to the breached party, (2) evolve with
industry standards to avoid outdated and ineffective requirements,
and (3) require uniform notification guidelines following a data
breach.
The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014 presented a
viable option for congressional enforcement of the data privacy and
security standards in the payment card industry. While the
PDPSA would meet the goals of providing uniform notification
guidelines and evolving with industry standards, it would fail to
adequately incentivize merchants to implement changes or compen-
sate harmed parties. Amendments to secure these important
objectives would make legislation like the PDPSA a strong measure
194. See supra Part II.D.
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to promote data security and protect all parties involved in elec-
tronic payments.
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